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ABSTRACT: It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological 
nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A 
reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also 
shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of 
any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final 
analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna’s positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological 
nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed. 
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In the abstract, Nāgārjuna’s basic argument is this fairly straightforward: For something 
to be real (sat, sadbhūtam), it must be permanent and unchangingCit cannot arise, 
change in any way, or cease to be.1 Thus, for anything that is composed of parts (a 
bhāva) or is a basic component of our experienced world (a dharma) to be real, it must 
be eternal—it never comes into being from causes and conditions (since whatever is 
eternal never arose) or ceases (since that would be a change). It must also be 
unchanging during its existence (since a change would not be eternal). So too, it is not 
created by anything else or in any way dependent upon anything else (since it would 
then not have its own independent reality). Nor can it affect anything else (since that 
would involve a change). Thus, it must exist by its very own power. So too, its very 
nature cannot change in any way or be the result of any dependence upon something 
else. In sum, what is real exists totally independently of all other things and any causes 
or conditions. Thus, it must be self-contained in both its nature and existence. In short, 
it must exist by its own existence (sva-bhāva).  
   But, Nāgārjuna argues, if everything were permanent, unaffectable, and  
________________________ 
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1  The basic criterion of permanence and immutability for what is truly real is shared by Advaita 
Vedāntins and early Greek philosophers, not only Parmenides. 
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unchanging, we could never become enlightened—we would be stuck permanently in 
our current unenlightened state. Buddhist praxis would be meaningless, and suffering 
(duḥkha) could never be ended. Indeed, nothing would work if things existed by self-
existence (since nothing totally self-contained could ever change). But we do see things 
arise, change, and cease to be. In fact, we see that everything internal and external is 
subject to arising, changing, and ceasing dependent upon causes and conditions. We 
see things arise (and so we must reject the extreme of complete nonexistence) and we 
see things cease (and so we must reject the extreme of eternal existence). Thus, self-
existence is not found by experiences or by the intellectual examination of things: when 
we analyze a car, we find no “essence”—no “car-ness”—but only parts that in turn are 
also empty of “essences.” 2  So too, more generally: when we analyze any of our 
experiences and any object that we experience, we find only impermanent, conditioned 
phenomena. Hence, self-existence is not established (siddha). This means that nothing 
exists by self-existence. In sum, we must conclude from experience that everything is 
empty (śunya) of self-existence (niḥsvabhāva) and thus nothing is actually real in the 
specified sense. No positive argument is needed to establish emptiness (śunyatā)—it is 
simply the automatic consequence of self-existence not being established. That is, the 
emptiness of things follows by default and thus does need its own supporting argument.  
 Thus, Nāgārjuna sees a “middle path” (madhyama) between “exist” (asti, sat), i.e., 
“real” in the sense of being eternal and unchanging—and total nonexistence (nāsti, 
asat) like, to use the Indian examples, a son of a barren woman or the horns of a rabbit.3 
All that there actually is is the “that-ness” (tattva) of the phenomenal realm—a world 
void of anything self-contained. The enlightened can still use conceptualizations to 
facilitate their way in the phenomenal world, but the unenlightened make the mistake 
of subconsciously projecting (prapañca) our concepts onto what is actually there and 
thinking that reality is make up of a multitude of self-contained parts. But because 
things are not “real” but empty of any unchanging inherent existence, the Buddhist path 
to end suffering can work.4 
 However, Nāgārjuna’s project has an interesting consequence: since self-existence 
is not established, there are not real (sat) things, and thus it follows that there are no 
 
2 Nāgārjuna writes that nothing is found or seen (vidyate) rather than nothing exists. But I will follow the 
contemporary convention and use “exists.” 
3 This goes back to the Discourse to Kātyāyana/Kaccayana of the P~li canon (Saṃyutta Nikāya II.215): 
the world of attachment relies on the duality of “Everything exists (atthita)” and “Everything does not 
exist (na atthita).” The Buddha teaches the “right view” (sammādiṭṭhi) of the “middle path” that avoids 
these extremes. When one sees the cessation of phenomena correctly, the extreme of the permanence 
and eternalness of existence is avoided; when one sees the arising of things correctly, the extreme of 
nonexistence is avoided. The text then presents the steps of dependent-arising. This is the only Buddhist 
text that Nāgārjuna cites (MK 15.7). 
4 Nāgārjuna never presents this argument in the abstract. Rather, his principal text—the Fundamental 
Verses of the Middle Way—addresses individual topics (e.g., time, action, suffering, the fundamental 
components of reality [dharmas], and a person) and shows how they cannot work if they were in fact 
real (i.e., self-existent and thus eternal and immutable). 
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realities to arise, change, or cease. So too, causation is not possible without real entities 
(bhāvas) to be a cause or effected (nor for Nāgārjuna is causation possible between 
self-existent entities). Thus, dependently-arisen “entities” are not real entities and do 
not arise (YS 19, 48). So too, “the nature of all things (dharmatā) is, like nirvāṇa, 
unarisen and unceased” (MK 18.7) since there are no self-existent entities to arise or 
cease. Nor are there real referents in the world for our words. Indeed, since words too 
are not real, the Buddha did not teach any real doctrine (MK 25.24, SS 69). Nāgārjuna’s 
Overturning the Objections shows how difficult it was for him to convince his 
opponents (there, proponents of the Hindu Nyāya school) that something could work 
or even exist if it was not self-existent. He sees his opponents as accepting that nothing 
exists except through self-existence, and thus seeing something as existing but not self-
contained was inconceivable for them. That is, he sees his opponent claiming that only 
self-existent entities are being real (sat) and capable of doing anything. To them, if 
something is empty of self-existence, it is totally nonexistent (asat, nāsti) and 
powerless to achieve anything. Thus, they saw Nāgārjuna as actually having to be 
committed to self-existent entities just to make any arguments or he was an ontological 
nihilism despite his claim of a “middle way” that rejects nonexistence. Some 
commentators in the West today also argue that he was logically committed to 
ontological nihilism. The purpose of this article is to examine that claim. 
 
1. WHAT IS “ONTOLOGICAL NIHILISM”? 
 
The first thing to clarify is what exactly his detractors mean by “ontological nihilism” 
since it is so counter-intuitive—isn’t is obvious that at least something exists, and so 
isn=t literal nihilism impossible to maintain? Isn’t the statement “The ultimate truth is 
that nothing exists” both, as Jan Westerhoff says (2016, 337), “obviously empirically 
false . . . and straightforwardly inconsistent”? Even without some “ultimate reality,” 
there still are appearances, and don’t they have some reality? Nihilism cannot mean 
simply that something ceases or is destroyed (uccheda) since that thing would have had 
to exist in some way prior to that event—that is not like the son of a barren woman.5 
Today in the West there are philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (1991) who believe 
that the self or consciousness is a groundless illusion: they do not reduce conscious 
phenomena to material phenomena but eliminate the phenomena themselves altogether 
by declaring that there is nothing there.6 Wilfrid Sellars (1997, 83) is not alone in 
claiming that in light of science “the common sense world of physical objects in Space 
 
5 Thus, uccheda does not refer to an eliminationism in the contemporary Western sense in which the 
alleged reality never existed in the first place. Nāgārjuna connects annihilation (uccheda) with 
nonexistence (nāsti) (MK 15.8-11): whatever is destroyed could not have been self-existent (since what 
is real is eternal and unchanging) and thus is not real. It is not as if something that had been real came to 
not exist. In sum, for Nāgārjuna if something is annihilated, it is not real and thus it was nonexistent all 
along. 
6 See Jones 2013, 11-12 for the distinction of reductionism and eliminationism. 
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and Time is unreal—that is, there are no such things.” Indeed, an illusion could be 
totally nonexistent—when a rope is misperceived as a snake, the snake has no existence 
whatsoever.7 But as Advaita Vedāntins would later argue, we dismiss the reality of 
something only in relation to the reality of something else (here, the rope). 
 Classical Indian and contemporary commentators who advocate a nihilistic 
interpretation of Nāgārjuna do not claim that he propounds the extreme of nonexistence 
(which would go against what he explicitly states) but rather that his position logically 
entails ontological nihilism. However, they do not have one uniform view of what 
“ontological nihilism” is.8 The extreme position is that without self-existent realities 
(i.e., things existing through svabhāva), everything is an illusion—there are no external 
objects in any sense or any basic components of experience (dharmas). The 
Buddhologist Louis de la Vallée Poussin expounded such a position: in rejecting the 
ultimate reality of dharmas, Mādhyamikas completely reject the existence of anything 
whatsoever—entities (bhāvas) are like the child of a barren woman—and thus the 
object described, the description itself, and the person doing the describing are all 
totally nonexistent (quoted in Westerhoff 2016, 352). Without some reality as a 
foundation, even illusions could not exist, and Nāgārjuna maintains that emptiness 
(śunyatā) is not a reality of any kind—not some absolute cosmic Void or vacuous 
ontological abyss out of which all phenomena emerge—but only the designation of the 
lack of self-existence in things (MK 13.8, 24.18). Thus, nothing exists on the 
conventional level (vyavahāram) or on the ultimate ontological level (paramārtha-
satya), and so nothing is real in any sense—the ultimate nature of reality is that there 
is an absolute nothingness. In the words of Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s “arguments 
set out to show that the idea of a theory that represents the nature of reality at the 
ultimate level is a chimera” (2017, 104). In sum, in the extreme nihilistic position 
nothing grounds either conventional truths or ultimate truths, and thus from the point 
of view of the ultimate ontological status of things nothing exists. 
  The most sustained defenses of Madhyamaka nihilism are by Thomas Wood 
(1994) and David Burton (1999, 2001). Both argue that the logical implication of 
Nāgārjuna’s arguments is extreme nihilism, even though according to Burton 
Nāgārjuna did not realize it. According to Wood (1994, 280), Nāgārjuna describes 
reality in terms of the “sheer, unqualified, absolute nothingness” of a son of a barren 
woman or the horn of a rabbit. According to Burton (1999, 4, 113-114), since all entities 
 
7 The rope/snake analogy is associated with Advaita Vedānta, but it may have been introduced by the 
Mādhyamikas, depending on the age of a certain text (see Jones 2011, 5-8). For Śaṃkara, one can deny 
the existence of an alleged reality only by appeal to another reality (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya III.2.22). He 
also tries to explain how something could appear even though it did not exist by employing the analogy 
to a person with an eye-defect who sees two moons when there is only one (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 
IV.1.15). The Buddhist Yogācārins also faulted Nāgārjuna in that way: an appearance only is possible if 
there is an underlying reality (tattva) (see Ferraro 2017, 76-78)—the “such-ness” (tathatā) of the 
dharmas remains. 
8 See Westerhoff 2016, 341-61 for various classical Indian and modern nihilistic Western positions. 
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lack svabhāva, they have merely a mind-dependent constructed existence 
(prajñaptisat) and so are ontologically nonexistent—eveything, including a person, are 
reduced to mere concepts and thus do not exist even conventionally. All things are mere 
mental fabrications and names only (Burton 2001, 179). Equally important, there is 
nothing unconstructed—no ontological foundation—out of which or by which entities 
can be constructed conceptually (Burton 1999: 4). Instead, all aspects of entities are 
conceptually constructed (ibid., 5). Thus, every object of thought and speech is utterly 
nonexistent. Appearances are empty and so there is nothing real behind them; indeed, 
even to call them “appearances” is misleading since they are totally nonexistent (asat) 
(ibid., 9, 269). Thus, Mādhyamikas do not really believe in the existence of the 
phenomenal world or any non-phenomenal absolute (ibid., 279).      
   I will proceed with the extreme interpretation of nihilism for this discussion:  
nothing exists, either conventionally or ultimately—there is no reality behind the unreal 
appearances. As Giuseppe Ferraro (2017, 94) says, the most consistent conclusion for 
a nihilist is that Nāgārjuna is describing “ultimate reality” in terms of emptiness, 
absence, and nothingness. Things that we take to be either ultimately or merely 
conventionally real are like the snake in the rope/snake analogy or like the child of a 
barren woman—things that have no reality whatsoever. 
 
2. SVABHĀVA AND ŚUNYATĀ 
For Nāgārjuna, svabhāva is whatever would give something the power to exist and to 
have the properties it has.9 Something “existing by its own inherent nature” is in no 
way produced by causes and conditions but exists independently of all causes and 
conditions (MK 24.16, VVV 22). Nor is it derived from something else that is real (MK 
15.1-2).10 An entity existing through svabhāva is absolutely independent of all causes 
and conditions and thus exists by its own power: its nature and existence are due only 
to itself. In Tibetan Buddhism, it is characterized as what “exists from its own side.” It 
is not created by, or be dependent upon, any other reality (MK 1.1). What exists by its 
 
9 The Abhidharmists= multiplying dharmas may have been the provocation that caused Nāgārjuna’s 
reaction, but he may be going further back to a more basic concept of “dharma” rather than responding 
specifically and only to the Abhidharmists’ conception itself. Thus, he may not have been 
mischaracterizing the Abhidharmists’ notion of “dharma,” as is often alleged, but going for a broader 
conception. In any case, Abhidharmists did not respond to Nāgārjuna’s attack (or to any Mahāyāna 
arguments). 
10 Nāgārjuna does mention the possibility of “other-existence” (para-bhāva) (MK 15.3). Other-existence 
for him is simply the self-existence of something else. Thus, if there is no self-existence, there can be no 
other-existence (MK 1.3, 15.3, 22.9). So too, something could not be dependent on the self-existence of 
something else and be itself real (i.e., self-existent). Thus, other-existence cannot be the source of another 
self-existent reality (MK 15.1-2, 22.2, 24.9) since nothing can be the source of anything self-existent. 
Other-existence is different from “otherwise-existence” (anyathābhāva), which would be a change in an 
existent with svabhāva, which is impossible (MK 13.6) since what exists by self-existence cannot 
change. 
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own svabhāva has being (sat) and cannot be created (MK 24.33) or otherwise come 
into existence (MK 24.22-23) or cease to exist or be eliminated (MK 22.24, VV 67) or 
be affected by any action (MK 24.33). What is self-existent cannot change (MK 15.8). 
Such things have an internal core that is isolated from other things. The only possible 
relationships between things existing by svabhāva are complete identity and complete 
disconnection (e.g., MK 2.21, 6.5, 18.10; VV 21).  
 The implication of such independence is that, however counterintuitive it may 
seem, what exists by svabhāva must be self-existent (since nothing could create it) and 
be eternal (since destruction, even by its own accord, would be a change in its being). 
All things that exist through self-existence would be permanent (eternal) because they 
would have no cause and what is without a cause is permanent (VV 55). For Nāgārjuna, 
having an unchanging “intrinsic nature” has the same effect. It is the source of its own 
“essence” and is self-maintaining. Such a power would also make each entity (bhāva) 
exist distinct from all other entities—no self-existent thing could be in any way 
dependent upon any other thing. Thus, it would be self-contained. The two dimensions 
of having its own unchanging nature and existing independently of all causes and 
conditions are not clearly distinguished in Nāgārjuna’s works. He never discussed 
svabhāva in the abstract, but in discussing different types of alleged realities, he utilized 
one aspect in some places and the other in other places. But since in his use of the term 
“svabhāva” one aspect implicates the other, that is a legitimate strategy. 
 No English term captures the two aspects of svabhāva. Translators render it 
variously as “self-existing,” “self-being,” “self-causing,” “self-generating,” “an 
existent (bhāva) by itself (sva),” “own-entity,” “own-being,” “own-becoming,” “own-
source,” “own-cause,” “own-nature,” “inherent nature,” “intrinsic nature,” “essential 
nature,” “essence,” “innate,” “substance,” or “inherent being.” Nāgārjuna uses the word 
in both the sense of self-existence and own-nature, and so it can be translated here as 
“self-existence” or “self-nature” depending on the context. It also will be characterized 
as “self-contained.” In addition, “svabhāva” sometimes means simply “by its own 
nature” in a non-philosophical sense, just as Nāgārjuna uses “ātman” (MK 10.15, 
22.16, 27.4) without a commitment to a metaphysics of an eternal, unchanging self. 
Aristotle’s concept of “substance” as an essence is the closest in Western 
philosophy to Nāgārjuna’s idea. Substance is what remains when all experienced, 
changing properties are removed. (It should be noted that modern empiricists question 
the very notion of “substance”—in John Locke’s phrase, a “something we know not 
what.”) But “svabhāva” denotes both self-existence and some unchanging nature—it 
is not a featureless reality distinct from all properties or attributes that sustains those 
properties. Nor should it be confused with matter: Buddhists have concepts for 
substance (dravya) and the perceived material form (rūpa). Nor does what Nāgārjuna 
intends involve mass or solidity. In modern philosophy, the closest is Leibniz’s idea of 
simple “monads”: each monad is the source of its own powers and properties (but not 
its own being) and all monads exist in a harmoniously working, coordinated universe 
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(but Nāgārjuna does not have this latter idea).11 In short, unlike Western ontological 
concepts svabhāva is a metaphysical power that gives a thing both its existence and its 
characteristics. 
For Nāgārjuna, self-existence is necessary for any thing of any type (bhāva or 
dharma) to be real (sat): there is no reality (sat) of an entity without self-existence (MK 
1.10). But no such self-existence is found in any conventional entity (bhāva) (VVV 1, 
17, 20) or in any ultimate component of the experienced world (dharma). Nothing self-
contained is found when we examine any entity or dharma.12 A dharma that is not 
dependently arisen is not found; thus, there is no dharma that is not empty (MK 24.19). 
So too, for things empty of self-existence to be real, things that are self-existent must 
first exist (so that there would be some reality that could become empty of self-
existence), but nothing whatsoever exists that is without self-existence, and therefore 
what is empty of self-existence cannot be real (MK 13.7)—thus, there are no real 
bhāvas or dharmas to arise or cease or to be empty. Thus, there is actually nothing to 
deceive us (MK 13.2). 
Nāgārjuna characterizes what is without self-existence as being empty (śunya). 
This does not mean being empty of matter—it is a metaphysical emptiness of anything 
that gives something the power to be, not a space empty of all material things. Nothing 
is self-created or self-contained. In effect, it is an expansion of the Buddhist idea of no-
self (anātman) to all things. Hence, Nāgārjuna discusses the emptiness of a person (MK 
18) just like any other phenomenon. There is no eternal, permanent “self” to a person 
or anything corresponding to a “self” in other things that would give anything its own 
self-contained existence. Any composite thing (a bhāva) cannot be self-existent since 
it depends on its parts, but even the parts are dependent on causes and conditions and 
thus are not self-existent. What arises from causes and conditions cannot be self-
contained in either its nature or existence—it has no intrinsic property or capacity to 
exist. Something that does not exist by self-existence cannot be a cause (SS 12) since 
it is not real (sat). But “emptiness” is not merely a negative conclusion: it indicates the 
true nature of reality (tattva).  
The noun “śunyatā” is the abstraction “emptiness,” but this does not make 
emptiness into a metaphysical source, a transcendent absolute, or indeed any other type 
of reality. (Nāgārjuna uses the adjective “śunya” more often than the noun “śunyatā” 
 
11 “Svabhāva” is a feature all self-existent entities would share and thus is not itself a lakṣaṇa, i.e., the 
defining “mark” of a phenomenon (e.g., the wetness of water and the heat of fire) that distinguishes one 
phenomenon from other phenomena. Such marks are also not real (self-existent) entities (MK 5.3-5). 
But svabhāva could be treated as a necessary part of the nature of each self-contained thing’s own unique 
lakṣaṇa. (Whether “being” is a property became an issue in Western philosophy concerning whether 
Anselm’s ontological argument is valid.) if so, emptiness would be a global lakṣaṇa—part of the defining 
nature of each impermanent phenomenon.  
12 The absence of a bhava—an abhāva—is possible as a reality only if a bhāva is real (sat), and since 
bhāvas are not real, neither can there be any real abhāvas (e.g., MK 15.4-5, 25.7). The two terms are 
also conceptually tied together and so are not independently real in Nāgārjuna’s way of thinking (see 
Jones 2014, 174-77). 
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in the Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way.) That is, emptiness is not an “essence” 
by which things exist. It is not a new special ontological power. It is not a property of 
things or any type of entity. Emptiness is not an ontological entity of any sort but only 
the designation for the lack of self-existence. That is, the term is merely a dependent 
designation (upādāya-prajñapti) of the true state of things (MK 24.18)—i.e., that 
everything is empty of any power to make itself self-existent. The term “emptiness” 
does not designate anything real (sat) but only the absence of anything real in the sense 
of being self-existent. (There is no one abstract “Self-existence” but only the alleged 
self-existence of different entities. So too, there is no one universal cosmic 
“Emptiness.”) Emptiness itself is merely another construct and thus empty of self-
existence (MK 22.11, 24.18; VV 24).13  The claim “All things are empty of self-
existence” is itself empty (as is that claim and this one). Anyone who reifies emptiness 
and thereby makes it into a cosmic Void or a new ontological “essence” giving things 
reality or a type of entity or a reality similar in any way to svabhāva is simply incurable 
(asādhyān) (MK 13.8)—they are hopelessly attached to seeing the world in terms of 
self-existent entities.  
Thus, the true state of things is that everything is essenceless in both their existence 
and nature—all things are contingent, impermanent, changing, and dependent upon 
other things. What is conditioned is not one or many, being (sat), or nonbeing (asat) 
(SS 32). From the point of view of reality (tattva), there is no being or nonbeing (SS 1) 
since both sat and the lack thereof would be properties only of entities.  
 
3.  TATTVA: THE FORGOTTEN CONCEPT 
 
One relevant concept is omitted in most discussions of Madhyamaka nihilism: tattva. 
The term “tattva” designates the sheer “that-ness” (tat-tva) of things (MK 15.6, 18.9, 
24.9).14 “Yathā-bhūtaṃ” (RV 28) and “dharmatā” (MK 18.7) also convey the idea of 
the true nature of things. Tattva is not a transcendent reality that is the source of the 
phenomenal world, or an unexperiencable Kantian noumenon, but is simply the 
phenomenal world as it really is—empty of any distinct svabhāva-existing objects 
(bhāvas or dharmas). From the point of view of reality (tattvatas), there is no existence 
(asti) or nonexistence (nāsti) of the entire cosmos (RV 38). Nor is tattva a self-existent 
entity or the lack of one—only objects are described as lacking self-existence and being 
 
13 Thus, the “emptiness of emptiness” is not some mysterious claim: it merely indicates that Nāgārjuna 
is treating “emptiness” like any other concept—a dependent designation (see Jones 2018a, 59-61). It is 
empty in the same way that all conceptualizations are: it arises only dependently. The “emptiness of 
emptiness” has become a major theme only in contemporary accounts of Madhyamaka thought. 
14 In MK 15.6, “tattva,” like “satya,” means both truth and reality: “Those who perceive self-existence, 
other-existence, an entity, and a non-entity do not perceive the truth/reality (tattva) in the Buddha’s 
teaching.” “Tattvatas” in MK 17.26 and 23.2 means “from the point of view of reality.” Siderits and 
Garfield (2013, 662) take these two verses to be Nāgārjuna’s opponent speaking, but even if so, this does 
not change Nāgārjuna’s acceptance of tattva.  
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dependently-arisen, not tattva. Thus, is-ness (astitā) is not a synonym for tattva—we 
must pass beyond “is-ness” and “is-not-ness” (RV 61) to see what is truly real. 
Because his soteriological objective is to end attachments, Nāgārjuna need not say 
much about tattva—i.e., what is left over once the objects that are the objects of our 
desires and grasping are ended. (So too, nirvāṇa is not a self-existent entity [MK 25.2-
16]. Nor for Nāgārjuna is nirvāṇa a name for tattva.) Only one verse depicts tattva. The 
passage reads: 
 
[9] The characteristic of what is actually real is this: not dependent upon another, peaceful, 
free of being projected upon by conceptual projections (prapañcair aprapañcitam), free of 
thoughts (vikalpas), and without multiplicity. [10] Whatever arises dependent upon another 
thing is not that thing, nor is it different from that thing. Therefore, it is neither annihilated 
nor eternal. [11] Not one, not diverse, not annihilated, not eternalCthis is the immortal 
teaching of the buddhas, the guides of the world (MK 18.9-11).  
 
Tattva is free of any discrete parts that we normally cut the world up into by our 
thoughts (vikalpas) that necessarily make distinctions—it does not have the artificial 
borders within it that our conceptual differentiations suggest. Nāgārjuna does not give 
any positive substantive characterizations of reality as it truly is.15 Rather, he focuses 
on denying that objects are self-existent. He equates emptiness with the Buddhist 
metaphysics of impermanence and dependent-arising (pratītyasamutpāda) (MK 24.18, 
SS 68), but tattva is not equivalent of śunyatā: śunyatā is not a reality of an kind but 
merely a conceptual designation of the lack of self-existence to things.16 So too, tattva 
is not a higher level emptiness but only the state of phenomenal reality. 
   Tattva thus is simply the phenomenal realm free of our conceptual division of it 
into self-contained objects (bhāvas and dharmas) and is open to direct experience. It is 
not some hidden or transcendent reality. Nāgārjuna does not reject sense-experience of 
the phenomenal world as cognitive—he wants to correct our experience
of the world and to see what is really there rather than our conceptual projections. 
Seeing tattva is not seeing something behind the phenomenal realm but seeing the 
phenomenal realm as it is without our conceptual overlay.17 Those who see reality 
 
15 Since Nāgārjuna does not give any positive ontology of tattva’s properties, he is antimetaphysical in 
that sense (see Ferraro 2013), but he does accept and discuss tattva and thus is metaphysical in that sense. 
Thereby, he also is affirming the existence of a reality (without arguing for its existence) against the 
claim of nihilism. 
16 What Tola and Dragonetti (1995) say about emptiness may more properly be said of tattva. 
17 To get a sense of this, think of a Gestalt figure such as the faces/goblet: the black and white colors are 
reality as it truly is (tattva), but we impose structure on them, thereby creating illusory faces or a goblet 
and then treat them as distinct objects (prapañca). The faces or goblet do not really exist, but the colored 
material does. That Nāgārjuna still wrote indicates that the enlightened still had conceptualizations 
operating in their mind even though they do not see the phenomenal realm cut up into distinct segments 
following those conceptualizations. On the issue of the relation of conceptualizations and experiences, 
see Jones 2020. 
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(tattva-darśana) do not see objects to desire and thus do not form the dispositions 
underlying the actions that propel the cycling of rebirth (MK 26.10) and thus are 
liberated from the karmic forces driving rebirth. Bhāvas and dharmas can still be 
parceled out by our concepts for practical purposes—it is only as discrete self-
contained objects that they are illusory. 
This brings up the role of conceptions in unenlightened experiences. Conceptions 
per se are not the problem—after all, the Buddha, the best among knowers of tattva (SS 
48), spoke, and that activity necessarily makes distinctions. Even if one wanted to argue 
that the Buddha was not in an enlightened state of consciousness when he taught—
something few Buddhists would accept—still the fact that he spoke at all meant that 
the enlightened could accept the use of language. The problem is the projection of our 
concepts onto reality and then distorting what is truly there by seeing it as a set of 
distinct self-contained objects—prapañca.  
Prapañca is projecting onto what is truly real (tattva) the conceptual 
differentiations we ourselves devise, and thereby seeing reality as a collection of 
discrete objects. Its importance to Nāgārjuna is indicated by the fact that it, not 
emptiness, is mentioned in the dedicatory verse of the Fundamental Verses of the 
Middle Way along with dependent-arising. Translators have rendered the term “projec-
tion of plurality,” “conceptual construction,” “hypostatization,” “objectification,” 
“reification,” “proliferation,” and “superimposition.” It makes our subjective mental 
discriminations into features of reality. 18  In this way, we create a false world of 
differentiated, isolated objects corresponding to our conceptual creations. The nature 
of the entire conventional world is born from prapañca (RV 50): through prapañca, 
we misuse our concepts to carve up tattva into distinct parts and end up focusing on the 
partness and not tattva. We mistakenly reify names and concepts into distinct referents, 
but since names and concepts can refer only to things that are discrete and self-
contained, no words apply to reality as it truly is. There are no real objects in tattva, 
but prapañca creates a proliferation of illusory distinct objects that we take to be 
existing independently of each other. Thus, we should abandon the fabrications of “is” 
and “is not” (MK 9.12). 
But tattva is not a collection of independent bhāvas or dharmas or itself a bhāva or 
dharma—it is “pacified” (śanta, MK 7.16, 18.9, 22.12, 23.15, VV29) since it is undis-
 
18 Mark Siderits equates prapañca with all conceptualizationCactually, he says “[s]uppose we take 
prapañca to mean conceptualisation” (2019, 645-646, italics added). He takes Nāgārjuna’s objective to 
be the cessation of all conceptualization, and he realizes that the claim “all conceptionalization falsifies” 
leads to the paradox that its truth would entail its falsity (ibid., 646), but he gladly accepts that his 
semantic interpretation leads there. But again, the Buddha spoke and others write (including Nāgārjuna) 
and so not all conceptualization is rejected, only the projection of those conceptualizations onto tattva 
and the discrimination (vikalpa) of distinct objects. As noted below, the enlightenment experience is not 
a matter of accepting some statement (which must be a product of conceptualization) and thus does go 
beyond any conceptualization, but in the enlightened state one can speak and write—one can see the true 
nature of things without a complete cessation of conceptualization, but prapañca ceases. 
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turbed by our projection of concepts into a set of clashing independent parts. Indeed, 
tattva is free of conceptualizations—the distinct objects that our concepts produce are 
merely our creations. The stilling of all conceptual support and the stilling of the projec-
tion of concepts onto reality is peace (śivaḥ) (MK 25.24). No concepts developed for 
the discussion of bhāvas or dharmas could apply because tattva is not divided up into 
parts for our concepts about entities to correspond to. Since tattva is not an entity or 
collection of entities, there is nothing within it to be an alleged referent and thus it 
cannot be expressed in terms of the attributes of entities but only more abstractly (as in 
MK 18.9-10). 
In effect, we see independent objects in the real world mirroring our concepts. This 
is seeing our concepts as instantiated in the real world. Thereby, we create the 
conventional world. But conceptions of independent entities never converge with 
reality as it really is. This includes even the distinction between experiencer and what 
is experienced (since neither are changeless, self-contained entities). The very discrimi-
nation (vikalpa) of distinct entities is the result of projecting our conceptual distinctions 
onto reality (MK 18.5). In short, we superimpose “self-existence” onto what is void of 
it. We thereby distort reality by seeing it as a mass of unconnected entities 
corresponding to the discrete concepts that our mind has devised. Such discriminations 
cause karmic acts and the resulting afflictions (MK 18.5). To be enlightened is to “still” 
the mind of this projection, not to be free of perceptions and concepts per se. Thus, the 
enlightened need not do away with sense-perceptions or concepts—they now perceive 
the phenomenal world as it is (tattva) free of self-contained entities, and they can still 
use whatever concepts that their culture uses to navigate in the perceived world and to 
teach others, but they do not project the categories that they are using onto the world 
(MK 22.15) and thus do not discriminate illusory entities. Thereby, the enlightened 
preserve both the language of conventional life and seeing reality as it truly is. 
The concept “tattva” deserves a prominent place in discussions of nihilism, but it 
is barely noticed by the disputants. The one exception is Giuseppe Ferraro (2013, 2014, 
2017), although he does not give tattva its central importance in Nāgārjuna’s scheme 
of things. According to Ferraro (2014, 452), Nāgārjuna is a realist since he admits the 
existence of a reality (tattva, paramārtha) that exists independent of at least the 
ordinary workings of the mind and that cannot be described or verbalized. David 
Burton (2001, 183-185) appears open to the possibility of Nāgārjuna affirming an 
indescribable “unconditioned reality” and affirming that the world is not entirely a 
mental fabrication, but he does not see tattva in those terms. In responding to Ferraro, 
Jay Garfield and Mark Siderits (2013, 662-663) cannot see tattva or dharmatā as 
evidence that Nāgārjuna posits an “inexpressible ultimate”; rather, they explain away 
the passages as at most being about dharmas. However, tattva is Nāgārjuna’s 
designation of phenomenal reality as it truly is once we remove our projection of 
conceptualized entities onto it—it is what is experienced once the perception of self-
contained entities is ended. 
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4. NĀGĀRJUNA IS NOT AN ONTOLOGICAL NIHILIST 
 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that Nāgārjuna was not an ontological 
nihilist: he affirmed a reality (tattva) even though the bhāvas and dharmas that we 
carve out of it are not distinct real (sat) entities. Tattva is not an entity and thus cannot 
be properly described as self-existent (svabhāva) or as a real entity. Thus, Nāgārjuna 
never connected svabhāva with tattva in any of his works but only with bhāvas and 
dharmas (e.g., MK 24.16, 24.22-23, 24.33; VVV 22). Thereby, he can affirm a reality 
while denying distinct real parts: he eliminates bhāvas and dharmas as self-existent, 
and since they are empty of svabhāva they are nonexistent.19 In sum, things in the 
phenomenal world are not isolated, real entities, and their parts in turn are empty of any 
self-existence, and so on all the way down. Everything is dependently-arisen. But 
Nāgārjuna also affirms an undifferentiated reality behind our conceptions—an 
ontological substratum that is not conceptually constructed. (So too, there must be some 
reality that does the conceptual construction.) Thus, he is not a nihilist with regard to 
all of reality.20 
 For this position to hold, Nāgārjuna must, as he claims, affirm a “middle path” 
between the permanence and eternalism (asti) of entities and their complete 
nonexistence (nāsti): “Whatever is dependently arisen, we call ‘emptiness.’ Once 
comprehended, this indicator is in fact itself the ‘middle way’ between eternalism and 
annihilationism” (MK 24.18).21 That nothing self-exists does not mean that nothing 
exists in any sense. He is affirming a mode of existence unrelated to svabhāva—an 
existence empty of svabhāva. This emptiness does not reach the extreme of the total 
nonexistence of the snake in the rope/snake analogy or the child of a barren woman—
empty phenomena are really there. While in Nagarjunian metaphysics it would be false 
to say “Entity x exists, but it lacks self-existence” or “Entity x is real, but it does not 
exist by self-existence,” this does not apply to tattva since tattva is not a self-contained 
entity or otherwise a conceptualized entity. But tattva still exists in a non-svabhāva 
sense. How to state that is not easy since in effect Nāgārjuna has made terms related to 
existence and reality—“real,” “exists,” “is”—terms of art: they involve self-existence, 
and so anything that does not involve self-existence is not real and does not exist in 
Nāgārjuna’s terminology. But he uses the self-existent mode of existence only with 
 
19 Is Nāgārjuna therefore a “realist”? There are varieties of realisms. He is a realist in the sense of 
affirming a reality independent of our mental conceptions (tattva), although reality is not cut up into the 
objects we conceptualize and thus he is not a realist with regard to discrete objects (dharmas or bhāvas). 
He sees his opponents as realists with regard to objects. He also rejects any real referents to our concepts. 
Thus, he would have to reject any correspondence theory of truth for claims from the ultimate point of 
view without rejecting language, and thus he is not a realist with regard to any realities possibly 
corresponding to our conceptualizations.  
20 Jay Garfield (2014) argues the opposite: Nāgārjuna is not a nihilist but a “robust realist” because for 
him entities (bhāvas) exist conventionally. 
21 Garfield (2014, 50) agrees that Nāgārjuna affirms another way of existing besides svabhāva (being 
empty), but he does not see this in terms of tattva. 
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regard to bhāvas and dharmas, not with regard to tattva. Nāgārjuna never applies “real” 
or “exists” to tattva. Thus, we must distinguish “real” or “exists” in his restricted sense 
of self-existence from “real” or “exists” as a broader category: something can be non-
svabhāva and still be real and exist in the latter way. In this way, Nāgārjuna can deny 
anything exists through svabhāva and still affirm that it exists in another manner—and 
that is what tattva does. Thus, that everything is free of svabhāva and therefore 
impermanent does not mean that nothing exists at all. He can also explain why there 
are appearances of entities while the extreme nihilists cannot. 
Thus, Nāgārjuna is not saying that bhāvas and dharmas do not exist but only that 
they do not exist as he believes that we normally take them to exist—i.e., through self-
existence. It is only that they are self-contained rather than the products of causes and 
conditions that is rejected. That is, the existence of bhāvas and dharmas is not disputed, 
only their mode of existence: they exist, but they are dependently-arisen and thus are 
empty of independent self-existence. There is something to a “self” and other things 
that enables them to work, even if their entity-ness is no more than our conception. 
Thus, bhāvas and dharmas are not real in the restricted sense of svabhavā but 
nonetheless do exist:  
 
Those who understand the nature of entities see that entities are impermanent, deceptive in 
nature, hollow, empty (śunya), selfless (anātman), clear (vivikta), without a locus or 
objective support in the world, rootless, with no fixed abode, totally arisen from root-
ignorance (avidyā), utterly bereft of beginning, middle and end, without a core, like the 
banana tree trunk (which is hollow at its core), like the castle of the Gandharvas in the sky, 
like an illusionCthus, this whole dreadful world appears (YS 25-27).22 
 
Entities have the status of dreams or magical illusions—i.e., dependent on other things, 
arising from other things, and without any self-existent substance. Bhāvas and dharmas 
are in the same boat as being conditioned and arising and falling dependently, but 
dharmas are still more fundamental in Nāgārjuna’s ontology than composite bhāvas. 
Dharmas do not become conventional entities even though they too are conventionally 
designated. 
   As discussed, tattva is not the sum of all bhāvas and dharmas since they are based 
on our conceptions—there are no self-existent entities but rather a “pacified” reality 
free of self-contained parts. Nor does Nāgārjuna argue for an interconnected whole but 
only for the “that-ness” of conditioned parts. Tattva is not made by cobbling together 
 
22 Like the Prajñāpāramitā texts, Nāgārjuna likens entities (bhāvas) to an illusion (māyā), a mirage, a 
dream, an illusory phantasm, a reflection, a bubble, foam, a circle of light produced by spinning a torch 
fast, and the imaginary castle in the sky of the Gandharvas (MK 7.34, 17.33, 23.8-9; SS 36, 40-42, 66). 
All are meant to indicate that things are not independently real but are impermanent and dependent (like 
a magic trick on a magician) and are also deceptive on the surface to the unenlightened—not that the 
phenomena do not exist. Nor are the analogies meant to convey that some sense-experiences are veridical 
but all hallucinatory. 
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parts—to see tattva as composed of dharmas is still looking at the phenomenal realm 
in the wrong way and misses the character of both tattva and the dharmas. We carve 
out eddies in the swirling phenomena of the world according to the interests and needs 
reflected in our conventions, but the resulting conceptualized entities are not real in the 
svabhāva sense but only our conceptual fabrications. Nevertheless, the impermanent 
parts have causal power: they can do work—indeed, Nāgārjuna argues in his 
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Overturning the Objections that only if 
entities are not self-contained can they accomplish anything and that his empty words 
can point out problems with self-existence and thus point out the emptiness of things. 
To the extent that emptiness is used in opposition to self-existence, it is merely a case 
of one illusory or dream reality putting an end to another illusory or dream reality (VV 
23). 
   The fact that something eternal and immutable is no doubt real does not entail that 
what is not permanent is totally nonexistent. Nor for Nāgārjuna does it follow from the 
fact that nothing is self-existent (and thus not real in the restricted svabhāva sense) that 
nothing exists in any sense. Nor must something be self-contained to be deemed real in 
another sense. And Nāgārjuna specifies another mode of existence—dependent-arising. 
Conceptualizing things is not itself the problem—prapañca is, i.e., reifying and 
projecting our concepts onto reality (tattva) and seeing back a collection of self-
contained entities, thereby distorting our perceptions and thinking. Things that concepts 
denote do not exist in the restricted sense, but the enlightened can use concepts to 
indicate impermanent eddies in the phenomenal world without being misled. Tattva is 
what is left when we remove the notion of conceptualized parts and thus is itself free 
of conceptions, but this does not mean that the enlightened cannot legitimately discuss 
at least a little of its nature by means of our conventional language. 
 
5.  PROBLEMS WITH NIHILISTIC INTERPRETATIONS 
 
It is understandable that many commentators endorse a nihilistic interpretation of 
Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics: Nāgārjuna gives his opponents all the verbs and adjectives 
concerning existing or being real and ties all the terms to his restrictive sense of 
svabhāva. Nihilists see him denying reality through svabhāva and conclude that he has 
to deny reality period. Being a permanent, immutable entity is all that can be real (sat). 
But they can do that only by endorsing self-contained individual existence as the only 
mode of existence: with svabhāva as the only criterion for existence, tattva, like bhāvas 
and dharmas, cannot be real since it is not a self-existent entity, and since the parts are 
each unreal (asat), the totality of them (tattva) is also unreal. Thus, to describe reality 
in terms of emptiness is ultimately to describe it in terms of nothingness even if 
Nāgārjuna did not see this consequence. Nihilists end up seeing reality only in terms of 
objects and svabhāva, and so the denial of self-existent bhāvas and dharmas is the total 
negation of reality. Thus, the error that nihilists make is to conclude that reality (tattva) 
is just a collection of bhāvas and dharmas and since these are not real in Nāgārjuna’s 
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restricted sense, nothing else can be real in another mode of being—in short, no 
fundamental real dharmas, no nothing. All things are just conceptual constructs (Burton 
1999, 9), and there is nothing else. But tattva is not the totality of such entities, and, as 
noted above, Nāgārjuna never discussed tattva in terms of self-existent entities. Tattva 
is ontologically prior to the parts that we carve out with our concepts. In effect, we cut 
entities out of tattva, but tattva is not made up by splicing together the parts that we 
create. 
    A similar problem arises from the ambiguity of “svabhāva” as “intrinsic nature” or 
“essence.” Again, there is Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense of “svabhāva” as existing by 
something’s own nature and whose essence is eternal and immutable, and a broader 
sense of a “nature” of a phenomenon that continues as long as the phenomenon happens 
to exist but is not connected to its mode of existence. Something can have a 
characteristic or property that only ends when the phenomenon ends without having 
the metaphysical baggage of the claim that since the phenomenon has this trait that it 
must exist forever and be unaffectable. Tattva has an “ultimate nature” in the broad 
sense even though it is not a self-existent entity.  
However, many commentators do not distinguish the two senses of “essence” and 
create paradoxes. For example, Jay Garfield (2014, 52) sees a fundamental 
contradiction: “emptiness is the intrinsic nature of anything that exists; hence the 
intrinsic nature of things is to lack intrinsic nature.” That is, “Things have no svabhāva, 
and that is their svabhāva.” That would indeed be a paradox. However, Nāgārjuna 
never said that. The situation for him can be stated without paradox: “Things are empty 
of self-existence (svabhāva), and that is their general ontological nature.” The 
reasoning implicit in Garfield’s line of thought must be that (1) Nāgārjuna defines 
svabhāva as being of a specific type of “nature” (one to which he adds that entities self-
exist by that nature), (2) Nāgārjuna denies that anything has svabhāva, and therefore 
(3) Nāgārjuna is actually denying all types of nature (whether an entity is self-existent 
or not). Obviously, that conclusion does not logically follow: something can be empty 
of specific type of “nature” without being empty of another type.  
The term “nature” need not be highjacked to mean only an “intrinsic nature” of 
Nāgārjuna’s svabhāva type. Something can be empty of anything making it self-
contained, and we can call this its “nature” or “essence” without being committed to 
the svabhāva metaphysics of permanent existence. But nihilists see Nāgārjuna as 
committed to only one mode of being—only svabhāva entails existenceCand so they 
see the lack of an “intrinsic nature” (in Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense) as leading to 
nihilism: the lack of svabhāva’s second component as an unwavering nature also means 
that entities cannot be eternal and thus are not real. So too, the self-nature of empty 
things is that they must have no self-existence and so do not exist. Thus, the intrinsic 
nature of the world is that there is nothing at all (see Westerhoff 2016, 338). However, 
for Nāgārjuna, the mode of existence for entities is emptiness, and that is the ultimate 
ontological nature of existing things. 
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Another problem concerns whether Nāgārjuna advances a view (dṛṣṭi) (MK 13.3, 
13.7-8), thesis (pratijñā) (VV 29, VVV59), or proposition (pakṣa) (RV 104; see MK 
2.10 and YS 50). Nihilists see only one mode of existence and so see any metaphysical 
position on the general nature of reality as a view and thus conclude with Nāgārjuna 
that he had no view. But in his works, Nāgārjuna treated “views” as only those positions 
based on the metaphysics of self-existence or total nonexistence (MK 13.3, 13.8, 15.10, 
21.14, 24.21, 27.1-2, 27.13-14, 27.29-30; RV 43-46; YS 23, 43-54) or a reality 
connected to svabhāva (SS 21). In short, all views assume existence through svabhāva 
or the extreme of total nonexistence (see Jones 2014, 147-149, 2018a, 62-64; also see 
Burton 2001, 183-184). Thus, for Nāgārjuna not every metaphysical position is a 
technical view. In particular, emptiness indicates the metaphysics of tattva that results 
when svabhāva metaphysics is refuted. This means that the doctrine of tattva is a 
metaphysical position that lies outside of Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense of “views” 
connected to self-existence since emptiness is the consequence of repudiating self-
existence.  
Thus, Nāgārjuna is not rejecting all metaphysics—he speaks of tattva and the 
nonexistence of bhāvas and dharmas. Thereby, he can consistently speak of 
relinquishing all views (MK 13.8) and still be replacing all svabhāva-related 
metaphysics with the tattva ontology. And he can still claim that anyone who treats 
emptiness as a dṛṣṭi is incurable (MK 13.8). So too, getting rid of “views” in this 
technical sense does not lead to nihilism but the “middle way” of emptiness. Nihilists, 
however, are inadvertently treating emptiness as a dṛṣṭi when they dismiss all 
metaphysics as views. 
A related problem concerns the “four options” (catuṣ-koṭi) (MK 12.1, 18.8, 
22.11-12, 25.15-18, 25.22-23, 27.13, 27.20; see RV 106, 115). Here Nāgārjuna rejects: 
(1) A exists; (2) A does not exist; (3) A both exists and does not exist; (4) A neither 
exists nor does not exist. Just as the key to Nāgārjuna’s stance on views relates to 
svabhāva, so here the key is that Nāgārjuna is denying the hidden erroneous 
presupposition of the four options: that things exist by svabhāva (see Jones 2014,160-
162, 2018a, 48-51; Siderits and Garfield 2013, 658; Ferraro 2014, 460).23 All he is 
saying in the strongest way possible is that the subject to each option does not exist: if 
we think any of the options may be correct, we are still thinking in terms of a svabhāva 
metaphysics and not of the tattva metaphysics. Denying the existence of a self-existent 
entity is as much a matter of svabhāva as affirming its existence: if we are thinking in 
terms of “exists” or “does not exist,” we are on the wrong track since we are still tacitly 
thinking in terms of the existence or nonexistence of self-existent “real” entities. Thus, 
even the fourth option is a matter of thinking in terms of self-existent entities and so 
 
23  The four options are affirmed in MK 18.8 as steps in the Buddha=s progressive teaching 
(anuśāsanam), with “neither being unreal (atathyam) nor being real (tathyam)” as the highest doctrine. 
“Tathyam” more literally means “being so” or “being such” and contrasts with what is false or deceptive 
(mṛṣā). For Nāgārjuna, the fourth option corresponds to rejecting the extremes of “is not” (nāsti) and 
“is” (asti).  
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must be denied. But since nihilists see only one mode of existence, the rejection of the 
four options is seen as a repudiation of all metaphysics, and so all ultimate truths are 
denied or at best are unstatable (e.g., Garfield 2014). However, for Nāgārjuna the four 
options in no way reject the possibility of another metaphysics based on another mode 
of being: tattva with its dependently arisen content. 
 
6.  THE CONFUSION OF “ULTIMATE REALITY” 
 
Contemporary nihilistic interpreters of Nāgārjuna also assert that entities would be 
“ultimate realities” if they existed through svabhāva. But since there is no svabhāva 
there are no ultimate entities. However, nihilists believe that for Nāgārjuna without an 
unchanging source nothing can be real: there must be at least one non-empty entity to 
ground impermanent phenomena or else all is unreal. Thus, since everything in 
Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics is dependent-arisen without an independently existing self-
existent foothold, nothing ultimately exists or can be real for him—there is no ultimate 
ground for the entities to stand on (see, e.g., Burton 1999, 109-111). If nothing exists 
ultimately, then nothing (including appearances) can exist at all (Ferraro 2017, 92). But 
that claim is wrong. First, an infinite regress of causes grounds each cause, as Bertrand 
Russell argued in his famous debate with Frederick Copleston. The entire chain would 
be left without an explanation (contra Russell), but each cause would have an 
explanation and that is all that is needed for Nāgārjuna: indefinite chains of causes and 
conditions need no further grounding for each empty phenomenon within them to exist. 
Second, an infinite chain of dependent entities is not any less grounded than a reality 
that is claimed to somehow be Aself-created” or “causeless” and just there (see Jones 
2018b, chap. 5). Each alternative seems absurd to its opponents, but advocates of 
svabhāva have the same basic problem of why their reality ultimately exists. Third, 
Nāgārjuna does present a foundational reality—tattva. There need not be a transcendent 
reality or some unchanging “absolute” to ground entities. Rather, the perpetually 
impermanent phenomenal world can be the reality behind our erroneous projections. 
Nāgārjuna is not paradoxically claiming that groundless appearances (bhāvas and 
dharmas) are the “ultimate reality.”24
   However, Nāgārjuna uses “svabhāva” only in connection with bhāvas and 
dharmas—i.e., alleged entities of one sort or another—not tattva. Tattva is not a type 
of entity that is an alternative to bhāvas and dharmas. Thus, there is no ultimate entities, 
but there is an “ultimate reality” (tattva). Nevertheless, the idea of “ultimate reality” 
introduces confusion into these discussions of nihilism. To exist by svabhāva means 
for Nāgārjuna that something self-exists independently of all other things does not 
depend on causes and conditions to exist and is indestructible, and thus it is an “ultimate 
reality.” So too, anything “ultimately real” in the svabhāva sense must have an 
 
24 Jan Westerhoff (2016, 356-357) also raises the defense of mutually supporting networks of dependent 
relations. But I do not see Nāgārjuna arguing that rather than chains of causes and conditions. 
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“intrinsic nature” (Siderits and Garfield 2013, 661). This leads nihilists to conclude that 
since nothing exists by svabhāva, there is nothing “ultimately real”—the only way to 
be ultimately real is to exist by svabhāva. So too, there is no “intrinsic nature” to reality, 
since that property is part of svabhāva. According to Siderits and Garfield (2013, 657), 
“the point of emptiness is to undermine the very idea of an ultimate reality with its 
ultimate nature.” 
But, since Nāgārjuna gives tattva another mode of existence than existing by 
svabhāva, “ultimately real” can have two senses here: the restricted sense of being 
eternal and unchanging by existing through svabhāva, and a broader sense of 
Aultimately real”—being real in the final ontological analysis, i.e., real and not 
reducible to something else. Something can be ultimately real in the second sense 
without being ultimately real in the first sense. However, nihilists believe that. 
Nāgārjuna can only mean the first, narrower sense: what is “ultimately real” must be 
entities existing through svabhāva, and since nothing exists through svabhāva, there is 
no ultimate reality in any sense and no foundation for other phenomena. According to 
Jay Garfield (2014, 49), conventional existence is the only kind of existence that is 
possible, and there is no “ultimate reality.” (Actually, with his proclivity for paradoxes, 
he says both that to exist conventionally is to be empty of ultimate reality [2014, 49] 
and that emptiness is the ultimate reality of things [2014, 50].) That is, if neither bhāvas 
nor dharmas are ultimately real by existing through self-existence, then there is nothing 
ultimately real in the final ontological analysis of things. So too, without an ultimate 
reality as a foundation, there are no reducible conventional realities—we are left with 
only unexplained appearances paradoxically having the status of the totally nonexistent 
child of a barren woman. 
Thus, the premise that “ultimate reality” is only possible through self-existence 
makes nihilism seem correct—there are only empty things and nothing “ultimatel real,”
and so nihilism is its logical consequence. But nothing in Nāgārjuna’s corpus justifies 
that premise. Nāgārjuna never questioned the reality of tattva. He can accept that no 
things (bhāvas and dharmas) are ultimately real (since they do not exist by self-
existence) and still affirm tattva in the final analysis. (And he can affirm that bhāvas 
and dharmas are conventionally real.) What is dependently arisen is the nature of 
reality in the final analysis—it is the “ultimate reality” of the world that we experience 
for him.  
Nāgārjuna never used a Sanskrit equivalent of “ultimate reality,” although 
“śunyatā”is sometimes translated so (e.g, Garfield 2014, 50, although he treats 
emptiness as a conventional reality), as is “tattva” (e.g., Ruegg 2000, 109). But overall, 
the concept is a Western insertion into the discussion and leads only to dealing with 
issues that are not germane to understanding Nāgārjuna. The term only leads to 
confusion when “ultimate reality” is restricted to existing through self-existence but 
then used to mean that there is no “ultimate reality” in the broader sense of being real 
in the final analysis. In addition, “ultimate reality” in the West has the connotations of 
a separate unaffectable reality transcending the phenomenal realm or otherwise being 
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an unchanging Absolute that is the source of other realities.25 It also leads theists and 
others to think of God. Thus, using that term may introduce a misunderstanding of 
Nāgārjuna since he never uses “tattva” or “śunyatā” in those senses but keeps reality 
within the phenomenal realm. Tattva is simply the content of the phenomenal realm 
seen properly as free of independently existing self-contained parts. It is a reality, but 
calling tattva the “ultimate level” of reality is confusing since there is no other “level 
of reality”—Nāgārjuna rejects conventional entities and the dharma components as 
being unreal (asat) in the final analysis. But Nāgārjuna never treats tattva as the 
ontological source of bhāvas and dharmas—as if empty objects were caused by tattva 
or arise out of it. Tattva can be said to “absolute” in that it transcends all conceptions, 
but that adjective would again introduce the idea of a source or a reality apart from the 
flux of phenomenal reality, which does not fit Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics.  
Ultimately, there is only the “that-ness” of the phenomenal world, not any more 
foundational or fundamental reality.26 But given that status of tattva, it would also be 
confusing to say that Nāgārjuna claims that there is no “absolute” or “ultimate reality.” 
All in all, the term “ultimate reality” is too ill-defined to add clarity to the discussion. 
Calling tattva (or dharmatā or paramārtha) real in the final ontological analysis is 
sufficient: this conveys tattva’s status without any confusing Western overtones or 
implicit connection to svabhāva. 
 
7. DOES NĀGĀRJUNA REJECT ALL ONTOLOGIES? 
 
As presented here, Nāgārjuna has an implicit ontology: the “that-ness” (tattva) of the 
phenomenal world that remains after we stop projecting our conceptual divisions onto 
it. The objects of our conventional world (including dharmas) are all empty of self-
existence and thus are not real (sat) in the final analysis, but the sheer being of the 
phenomena still stands. Impermanent and dependently-arisen entities still “exist,” only 
not as self-contained realities. That is an ontology. It affirms a distinction between 
reality as normally misperceived and seeing reality as it truly is. It also the distinction 
between two types of truths—truths about reality as conventionally conceived (saṃvṛti-
satya) and those about reality as it truly is (paramārtha-satya). Nihilists, however, 
 
25 T. R. V. Murti (1955) presented a popular account of Madhyamaka along the lines of an Advaita-like 
“Absolute”—i.e., Nāgārjuna was only denying all doctrines about reality but was not denying the 
positive reality that transcends the phenomenal realm. However, unlike Advaita’s Brahman, tattva is not 
a reality transcending the phenomenal world, not conscious, and is open to sense-experience. Nor does 
anything in any of Nāgārjuna’s works suggest any of the absolutes adopted by some other Mahāyāna 
schools. Rather, what he says about tattva suggests only the early Buddhist and Prajñāpāramitā subject 
of the nature of the phenomenal realm—as discussed, tattva is simply the phenomenal realm free of our 
conceptual overlay. Fyodor Stcherbatsky (1965 [1927]) identified nirvāṇa and paramārtha-satya with 
tattva and treated them all as an absolute Void that is also a fullness out of which things arise. Also see 
Tola and Dragonetti 1995.  
 
26 See Jay Westerhoff (2017) for a discussion of Nāgārjuna’s rejection of foundationalism. 
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routinely claim that Nāgārjuna rejects all metaphysics: all metaphysics are views 
(dṛṣṭis), and Nāgārjuna rejects them all—including emptiness—so that we will have no 
mental objects to grasp and thus can become free of suffering.27 Therefore, the empty 
ontology of nihilism, despite it being a metaphysics, is logically entailed by 
Nāgārjuna’s position. 
  It is certainly true that Nāgārjuna does have that soteriological purpose: his is not a 
disinterested philosophical project to describe reality but to show how enlightenment 
is possible and how the Buddhist praxis can work—if nothing could change, how could 
we end our current state of suffering? And it is also true that we have to remove all 
conceptualizations from our mind to experience reality (tattva) as it is: emptiness shows 
that there are no “real” selves or objects to crave or grasp. Tattva is “free of thoughts 
(vikalpas)” that make distinctions (MK 18.9). “When the domain of thought has ceased, 
then what can be named has ceased” (MK 18.7). Thereby, the mind is calmed, and we 
can see reality as it truly is. An enlightenment-experience would transcend our normal 
way of looking at reality, and it would go beyond any linguistic event. To use an earlier 
Buddhist analogy: enlightenment is not the intellectual acceptance of the idea “Water 
quenches thirst” but actually drinking water (Saṃyutta Nikāya II.115). Quenching our 
thirst by drinking water is not a linguistic event—it thus goes beyond what is expressed, 
and so the realization is ineffable in that way. But this does not render the statable claim 
“Water quenches thirst” in any way untrue. Once we have drunk water, we know what 
it is like to drink water and thus now know the claim in a way that we did not when 
relying on the testimony of others. That may change how one views water and 
understands the claim, but the stated truth remains the same.  
So too with enlightenment: realizing the emptiness of things and the resulting 
direct, unmediated seeing of tattva (tattva-darśana, MK 26.10, SS 39) may initially 
require a state of consciousness in which our linguistic abilities are temporarily in 
abeyance. One then sees reality properly, i.e., free of entities existing by svabhāva, 
concepts (vikalpas), and conceptual proliferation (prapañca). Not merely conception 
projection (prapañca) is abeyance but all conceptions. The stilling of all conceptual 
support and the stilling of the projection of concepts onto reality is “peace” (śivaḥ) (MK 
25.24). However, even though the event of realizing the final truth is “beyond 
language” and “ineffable,” stating the final truth after the experiential realization of it 
may still be possible—those whose awareness (buddhi) has gone beyond “It is” (asti) 
and “It is not” (nāsti), and thus is free from clinging, clearly perceptive the nature of 
conditionality (YS 1) and can state that. But at least some nihilists see all language as 
implicating reification and prapañca, and since there are no “real” (sat) referents for 
any terms, there are no ultimate truths (Garfield 2014, 47, Siderits 2019, 646). All 
language is conventional and distorts reality; any assertion is at best only 
conventionally true and nothing is ultimately true (Garfield 2014, 51, 53). Buddhist 
 
27 Giuseppe Ferraro (2014, 461) also thinks that any attempt to speculate on tattva is a dṛṣṭa) and thus 
detrimental soteriologically and so should be abandoned. 
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doctrines are reduced to a “raft” (Majjhima Nikāya I.22) existing within the 
conventional world to get us to the other shore of enlightenment and of no ultimate 
reality.28 But these nihilists cannot explain how the Buddha could talk without resorting 
to claiming that the Buddha went in and out of enlightened states. 
   In sum, Nāgārjuna does not reject all ontologies but only svabhāva-based 
ontologies of self-contained entities existing or not existing (dṛṣṭis). He advances an 
ontology that shows how the Buddhist path can work. 
 
8.   “ULTIMATE TRUTH” 
 
In addition, contemporary nihilistic interpreters believe that “ultimate reality” involves 
self-existent entities, and since there are no self-existent entities, there can be no 
ultimate truths: there is no reality to mirror any claims, and so nothing to state (or at 
least any “ultimate truths” are not statable).29 For example, Jay Garfield (2014) believes 
that the level of dharmas is “ultimate reality” for Nāgārjuna and since dharmas are 
empty, there are no real referents for claims and thus there are no ultimate truths—all 
truths reduce to conventional ones. For Mark Siderits, “a statement can be ultimately 
true only by virtue of correctly describing an ultimately real entity,” and since there are 
no ultimately real entities, there are no ultimate truth (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 304; 
also see Siderits 2007, 180-183, 200-204). Garfield (2014, 50) also claims that since 
Nāgārjuna identifies dependent-arising and emptiness (MK 24.18, VVV 70, SS 68), 
“by implication” conventional and ultimate truth are identified—despite Nāgārjuna 
stating that those who do not distinguish conventional and ultimate truth do not see the 
profound teach of the Buddha (MK 24.9; see Jones 2014, 51-54).30  
 For nihilists, there must be ultimate realities (self-existent entities) for there to be 
ultimate truths, and since there are no self-existent entities, there can be no ultimate 
truths. But ultimate truths are about whatever is real in the final analysis, not 
necessarily a depiction of “ultimate entities.” For Nāgārjuna, there is something real in 
 
28 It can be argued that the Buddha never taught a truly “ultimate truth” but only presented a path that 
enabled us to end our existential suffering (duḥkha) that results from clinging to false realities (the self 
and objects of desire): he had no interest in reality apart from the problem of suffering, and so what 
reality is “in itself” apart from his soteriological concern is irrelevant—he remained agnostic about 
metaphysical issues related to the ultimate status of the phenomenal world and to any purported 
transcendent realities. This may be true, but it does not change the fact that Nāgārjuna presents a picture 
of reality that enables the Buddhist path to work, and he presents final “ultimate truths,” not 
“conventional truths,” at least within the context of the Buddhist way of life. This does not justify Siderits 
and Garfield’s (2013, 659) claim that “[w]hat one needs to know in order to attain liberation is that the 
very idea of how things ultimately are is incoherent”—nothing in Nāgārjuna’s texts justify that broader 
claim. 
29 For a discussion of the problems that such a “mirror theory” of language in mysticism, see Jones 2016, 
chap. 6. 
30 Classical Indian philosophy does not differentiate “truth” and “reality” in the term “satya” and related 
words. Thus, “ultimate truths” and “ultimate reality” become inextricably connected. 
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the final analysis (i.e., tattva), and thus there may be truths about it from the highest 
point of view or the highest purpose (paramārtha)—self-existent realities are not 
needed to ground the truths. Nor do we have to twist claims about emptiness into 
conventional truths: claims of emptiness reveal the true ontological status of 
conventional entities and thus are ultimate truths—conventional claims are based on 
treating entities as self-contained realities, and thus emptiness is false from a 
conventional point of view. Since ultimate truths are any truths about the true 
ontological status of things in the final analysis, ultimate truths and an ontology of 
impermanence are compatible. 
   Nowhere does Nāgārjuna state that ultimate truths are not statable (see Jones 2014, 
54-55). Ultimate truths are not ineffable in any sense for him simply because all 
referents are by definition conventional. Tattva itself is “free of being projected upon 
by conceptual projections, free of thoughts, and without multiplicity” (MK 18.9), but 
Nāgārjuna never says that truths about it (such as that one) cannot be stated. If he 
thought so, he would have stated that nothing could be stated about tattva there. Rather, 
Buddhists can utilize the conventions of a language to teach ultimate truths (MK 24.10). 
So too, the final analysis of the ontological status of entities—how they actually exist 
rather than appear conventionally—can be stated, and Nāgārjuna discusses their 
emptiness.  
   In sum, truths are about whatever is real in the final analysis even if that reality is 
not self-existent, and they are statable: ultimate truths state the ultimately correct 
ontological account of reality. Nāgārjuna states that there are two types of truth, that 
the statement of the ultimate truths depends on conventions, and that it is based on the 
ultimate truths that one can become enlightened:
 
[8] The buddhas’ teaching of the doctrine rests upon two categories of truths (satye): 
truth based on worldly conventions (loka-saṃvṛti-satyam) and truth from the highest 
point of view (satya-paramārthatas). [9] Those who do not discern the distinction of 
these two categories of truths do not discern the profound truth (tattvam) in the 
teachings of the buddhas. [10] Without relying upon worldly convention 
(vyavahāram), the truth from the highest point of view cannot be taught. And without 
reaching the truth from the highest point of view, nirvāṇa cannot be achieved (MK 
24.8-10). 
 
[69] The ultimate truth (paramārtha) consists of this teaching of emptiness. The 
Buddha, while holding to worldly conventions (loka-vyavahāram), conceived the 
world properly. [70] Worldly doctrines (laukika-dharmas) are not abolished, but from 
the point of view of reality as it really is (tattvatas) the Buddha never taught a doctrine. 
But the ignorant do not understand what the Buddha said and are afraid of his spotless 
speech (vimala-vacana) (SS 69-70). 
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Once one has realized the ultimate truth, one can again utilize concepts to navigate the 
world and to lead others to enlightenment. Only conceptual projection is ended 
permanently in the enlightened state, not the use of language itself. 
Mark Siderits (2007, 203-205) gives a “semantic” interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s 
thought rather than the more common “ontological” interpretation, such as the one 
presented here. That is, Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness is not about reality but about 
what we can say about reality, i.e., about our alleged conceptual claims to truth. Under 
this approach, “[w]hen a Mādhyamika says that things are empty, this is not to be 
understood as stating the ultimate truth about the ultimate nature of reality. Instead this 
is just a useful pedagogical device, a way of instructing others who happen to believe 
there is such a thing as the ultimate truth about the ultimate nature of reality” (Siderits 
and Katsura 2013, 247). According to the semantic interpretation, “the point of 
emptiness is to undermine the very idea of an ultimate reality with its ultimate nature” 
(Siderits and Garfield 2013, 657). All statements are conventional and actually falsify 
reality (Siderits 2019, 646). For Siderits, Athe ultimate nature of reality is something 
that is inexpressible and only cognizable nonconceptually because, there being no 
ultimately real entities to figure in truth-makers for purported descriptions of the 
ultimate nature of reality, no such description (including ‘inexpressible’ and 
‘unconceptualizable’) can be asserted” (2015, 120-121). Siderits may reject tattva as a 
reality, but even if he accepted a reality such as tattva, he would still have to deny that 
anything could be said about it. Such a position may be defendable on philosophical 
grounds, but it is hard to defend from Nāgārjuna’s works: it reduces all truths to 
conventional truths, and Nāgārjuna is prepared to say some general things about tattva 
(e.g., in MK 18.9), as discussed above.  
So too, contra Siderits, Nāgārjuna, as discussed above, accepts conceptions and 
does not reduce them all conceptualization to prapañca (contra Siderits 2019, 645). 
And as part of those conceptions, the enlightened can present an ontology to render 
understandable what was experienced in the enlightened state. Here, Nāgārjuna has an 
ontology of that-ness of the phenomenal world and the emptiness of conceptualized 
entities. And he states ultimate truths. He can use conventional concepts to depict the 
arising and falling of empty phenomena as dependent upon causes and conditions 
without projecting the idea of self-contained entities onto reality and can explain that 
reality in terms of its sheer that-ness.  
 
9.   CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS  
OF MEREOLOGICAL NIHILISM AND DEFLATIONISM 
 
Ontological nihilism has become a much-discussed topic in contemporary Anglo-
American metaphysics. “Ontological nihilism” here does not mean literal 
nothingness—in Jason Turner’s words (2011, 4), that reality is “an unstructured and 
undifferentiated blob, but without the blob.” No contemporary Western philosopher 
goes as far as nihilistic interpreters of Nāgārjuna and denies that something exists. 
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Rather, ontological nihilism is a form of anti-realism and reductionism concerning 
whether conventional objects (or any objects) exist (see Jones 2013, 13-15). That is, it 
is a matter of the composition of complex entities: nothing real has parts, but the parts 
exist. Thus, this is “compositional” or “mereological” nihilism concerning the relation 
of wholes to their parts—any composite entity is not actually real, only their most basic 
components are. Nihilists today deny that everyday objects and properties such as 
tables and chairs and colors are real, but they affirm either that fundamental objects 
exist (moderate nihilism) or that at least fundamental properties arising from the space-
time continuum exist (radical nihilism).  
   Thus, conventional objects are reduced either to whatever are the most fundamental 
objects discovered in quantum physics or to the fundamental properties instantiated in 
space-time without there being any discrete objects. Composite objects are simply 
arrangements of elementary objects. Conventional language about everyday entities is 
not discarded since talk about “tables” and “chairs” can be paraphrased properly in 
terms of the true ontological parts of reality. For example, for Ted Sider (2014, 257), 
the statement “There are tables” can be restated as “Some mereological simples are 
arranged table-wise.” Both the ordinary description and the restated ontologically 
correct description describe the same facts. (How to restate conventional claims 
without a commitment to some type of objects has proved to be an issue [see Diehl 
2018].) In radical nihilism, only the reality of the space-time continuum and properties 
is affirmed. In more extreme forms, all there really is is just atomless and structureless 
stuff—or to use the technical philosophical term introduced by David Lewis (1991, 
20), “gunk.” Parts divide into smaller and smaller parts forever—all that is real is an 
amorphous lump. In a gunk universe, the true ontology has only one entry: gunk (see 
Le Bihan 2013). Ontological nihilisms with determinate parts or properties have more 
complex fundamental ontologies. 
 Nāgārjuna brings something new to this situation. The new developments in 
Western philosophy make mereological nihilism respectable, and Nāgārjuna might be 
called a “mereological nihilist,” even though he accepts bhāvas as “conventionally 
real”—a category not in contemporary ontological nihilists’ ontologies. But his 
distinction of “two truths” dovetails with the new nihilism: conventional truths are 
affirmed for everyday discourse, and ultimate truths are in terms of the ultimate 
components of reality (the dharmas). He also agrees that conventional truths are 
deceptive since the entities involved in them—bhāvas—are not the ultimately real 
components of reality: from the point of view of an ultimate ontology, tables and chairs 
do not exist as “real” (sat) entities, although there is a reality behind them.  
 However, Nāgārjuna differs from contemporary philosophers concerning the nature 
of the ultimate components of reality. The Western philosophers let physics determine 
what the most fundamental components are—the components are either the smallest 
particles in space-time or the properties arising from space-time. But Nāgārjuna sees 
the ultimate construction of the phenomenal world in terms of basic components of our 
experience—the dharmas. As a Buddhist, Nāgārjuna is interested in how our 
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experience of the world causes our suffering, not the nature of the world independent 
of our experience. Hence, his focus is on the fundamental components of experience. 
Dharmas are not material-like particles or properties, unlike the simples in physics. 
Also unlike the simples in physics, Nāgārjuna advocates the direct experience of tattva 
(i.e., an experience of the “that-ness” of phenomenal reality)—a topic of no interest to 
contemporary nihilists. In directly experiencing the components of experience, we 
experience the world free of our culturally-constructed categories and concepts. 
 In sum, Nāgārjuna’s mereological nihilism takes a different tack than do 
contemporary Western versions in that the ultimate simples are not material. This leads 
to other differences from contemporary metaphysics. As discussed above, the dharmas, 
like the entities of the everyday world (the bhāvas), are empty of anything that would 
make them self-existent (svabhāva). Thus, the fundamental components of our 
experience are not any more “real” in the sense of being self-contained realities than 
everyday entities. But, as Nāgārjuna’s critics argue, if the fundamental components are 
not real, how can this lead to anything but literal nihilism? How can Nāgārjuna be 
committed to something if it is not real? However, as discussed, “self-existence” is not 
Nāgārjuna’s only criterion for being real: dharmas are “real” even if they are 
conditioned and not self-existent. 
  And as discussed above, unlike a pure gunk world, Nāgārjuna also affirms a 
fundamental reality to the phenomena world behind our conceptionsCtattva. Tattva has 
structures: dharmas have a genuine structure despite not having any self-existent 
substance, and the lawfulness of dependent-arising also indicates structure. The 
dharmas are not our fabrications but the components of our experienced world even 
though they arise and cease conditionally and thus are not self-contained entities—they 
are the real “factors of our experiences.” In their dharmic analyses of what is real, 
Buddhist Abhidharma schools distinguish dozens and dozens of dharmas connected to 
sense-experience, emotions, and other mental states, but there is only one category for 
“matter”—“form” (rūpa). And even there the dharma relates only to our experience, 
not to “matter in itself”—it is about the form of things as we experience them, not what 
they may be independent of our experience. By naming things, we give what is actually 
real a form—hence, the common phrase for the physical world: “name and form (nāmā-
rūpa).” Dharmas are mereological simples, but tattva is not built out of them—it is not 
as if tattva is assembled by adding the dharmic parts together, any more than space-
time for contemporary nihilists is built up from fundamental particles. Still, dharmas 
provide definite structures to tattva even if for Nāgārjuna they are not fixed entities but 
empty of any svabhāva. This disavowal of self-existent components distinguishes 
Nāgārjuna from the Abhidharma schools. 
 In sum, tattva is not empty of structured realities. But Nāgārjuna’s fundamental 
reality is in terms of the experienced stuff existing independently of our 
conceptualizations, not fundamental particles—he accepts language even though there 
are no fixed entities in the world to be referents. Thus, he would disagree with Jason 
Turner (2011) over the need for fundamental objects in how we see the world. But as 
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discussed, he states very little about the actual nature of tattva. Thus, he may well have 
agreed that language is object-oriented and agreed that there is a problem for any 
language in expressing a fundamental reality devoid of discrete objects but would not 
reject his ontology for that reason. 
 This also impacts the issue of “ontological deflation” in the sense used by David 
Chalmers (2009), i.e., the rejection of the entire metaphysical project of finding the 
fundamental elements of reality because we cannot find ultimate truths in this field. 
Thus, no fundamental ontology should be espoused. To be more precise, some have 
argued Nāgārjuna’s project entails a weak deflationism in that he refuses the ultimate 
reality of entities and dharmas but accepts the conventional world as long as we do not 
take it without any ontological commitments—i.e., that we do not take bhavas and 
dharmas to be self-existent realities (MacKenzie 2008, Gandolfo 2016). In short, 
Nāgārjuna deflates the ontology of conventional entities and does not espouse any 
ultimate ontology. In this deflationism, we can make claims about conventional entities 
without requiring any commitment to their ultimate reality or foundations—any claim 
of a fundamental ontology is a dependent designation and thus dependently arisen 
(MacKenzie 2008, 204). However, as discussed, while Nāgārjuna mainly discusses 
why there are no ultimately real entities (in the sense of svabhāva), he does affirm a 
robust reality beyond our conceptualized entities, and that makes any deflationist 
interpretation hard to maintain. That Nāgārjuna ends his principal world by affirming 
that the Buddha taught a “true doctrine” (MK 27.30) also must make deflationists 
scramble (see Gandolfo 2016, 220-223). 
 
10.   CONCLUSION 
 
Nāgārjuna’s writings are terse enough to have led to a fascinating variety of 
interpretations—and not just on the issue of ontological nihilism—and none can be 
defended as obviously the best. The differences have led to many long articles and 
books, and the disputes seep down to translations of verses. But the equation of 
emptiness (śunyatā) with nothingness by both Jay Garfield and Mark Siderits leads to 
paradoxes that only confuse the issues—“The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate 
truth,” “The ultimate reality is that there is no ultimate reality.”31 Such contradictions 
would normally be a reductio ad absurdum of their positions, but they actually enjoy 
espousing paradoxes. Their denial of ultimate truths or the equation of ultimate and 
conventional truths explicitly also goes against what Nāgārjuna actually wrote about 
the “profound teaching” of the Buddha (MK 24.9) and so should be grounds to reject 
their positions as possibly valid interpretations of Nāgārjuna. Instead their position has 
become fashionable. David Burton and Thomas Woods also equate emptiness with the 
 
31 Mark Siderits may have meant the claim “The ultimate is that there is no ultimate truth” (Siderits and 
Katsura 2013, 273) only rhetorically to grab people’s attention rather than literally, but he accepts that 
others (including Jay Garfield) embrace the paradoxical reading (Siderits and Garfield 2013, 658). (See 
Jones 2018a.) 
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total lack of any reality. But this goes against Nāgārjuna’s “middle way” that avoids 
the nihilist extreme, not to mention going against all empirical evidence (Oetke 1996, 
99). At least Jan Westerhoff (2016) admits that his philosophical defense of 
Madhyamaka=s alleged nihilism is not an argument that can be found in Nāgārjuna’s 
works. 
Moreover, nihilism is hard to defend when there is instead a straightforward 
interpretation of the emptiness of entities based on verses that entail that a reality—
tattva—remains once we stop projecting self-existence onto empty entities. The 
nihilists= error centers on thinking that for Nāgārjuna either entities must be self-
existent or nothing is real. But tattva is not made up of bhāvas or dharmas. Making 
tattva a central piece of the puzzle offers a simpler and more consistent reading of 
Nāgārjuna’s works, one that does not have to deny the plain meaning of passages or 
that boxes a commentator into the corner with paradoxes. Entities can then be free of 
self-existence without the specter of nihilism rising. Indeed, if Nāgārjuna’s notion of 
“tattva” were given more prominence in modern discussions of his texts, the popularity 
of the nihilist interpretations would dwindle away. 
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